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Foreword
By the very nature of their work, foundations enjoy privileged access to knowledge. Our offices overflow 
with tangible manifestations of this knowledge in the form of grant reports, evaluations, assessments, and 
research studies. This information is complemented by the knowledge gleaned by our staff given their 
daily work in the field. And yet, for all of this, most of what foundations learn rar ely gets captured and 
shared in any formal way. Moreover, foundations are often criticized for focusing solely on the good 
news and positive results on those rare occasions when they do share  
their knowledge. This is not such a report.
In 1999, The James Irvine Foundation launched a major initiative, called Communities Organizing 
Resources to Advance Learning (CORAL), to improve the educational performance of low-achieving 
students in California by focusing on five sites. Envisioned as an eight-year, $60 million initiative, it 
would be the largest undertaking by Irvine in the Foundation’s history. While we do not yet have final 
evaluation results (and we intend to share those early in 2008), we do have a story to tell about our 
need to change the course of the initiative midstream. It is a complicated and difficult story, for it reveals 
numerous shortcomings on our Foundation’s part. We felt compelled to share these lessons in the hope 
that others might benefit from this experience and avoid similar pitfalls.
In order to glean what specific lessons might be applicable to others, we asked Gary Walker, the 
former President of Public/Private Ventures, to reflect on that question and to share his observations. His 
firm was a key partner for us in reorienting the focus of CORAL, as you will read in this report, so he 
is not a dispassionate observer. At the same time, he and his colleagues brought a necessary rigor to the 
midcourse correction, and he participated actively in the process of implementing it. He was provided 
access to numerous internal documents, he interviewed key Board and staff, and this published product 
reflects his findings and observations, not ours, which is as we wanted it. 
Finally, it bears noting that while there has been much change at Irvine since 1999, I served as 
Vice President at the time and was an active part of the leadership team that formulated and launched 
this initiative. I note this fact because it is often much easier for foundations to reflect upon (and criticize) 
the work of their predecessors, but that is not the case here. I assume my share of the responsibility for 
how this initiative unfolded, and I sought to help in its reorientation a few years ago. We are certainly 
committed to learning from this experience at Irvine, and I hope the lessons captured here might shed 
light for others in the future.
James E. Canales  
President and Chief Executive Officer 
The James Irvine Foundation 
May 2007
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Author’s Note
The James Irvine Foundation asked me to document and draw lessons from the midcourse assessment 
and change that it undertook on its CORAL initiative, both for the Foundation’s internal reflection 
and in the hope that the findings would be useful to the broader philanthropic community. 
I was part of the CORAL assessment and change, serving as president of Public/Private 
Ventures when the organization was awarded a grant through a competitive process to assist the 
Foundation in the effort. I have intimate direct knowledge of the midcourse change process.  
I also admittedly have a bias — that it was a useful process. The reader will draw his or her own 
conclusions.
The Foundation was completely open to my inspection of internal documents; interviews with 
Foundation staff and Board were very frank; and I was encouraged to come to my own judgments. 
In addition to Foundation interviews and documents, I drew heavily on Public/Private Ventures’ 
experience with the five CORAL cities and Foundation staff in my analysis. In arriving at lessons,  
I am also influenced by my own three decades of experience with major philanthropic initiatives while 
working at MDRC and Public/Private Ventures, and by my experience serving on the boards of 
directors of various foundations.
The lessons and recommendations I present in this report emerged from this CORAL 
experience and from my broader experience with large initiatives and philanthropy. Though some 
foundations, including The James Irvine Foundation, have already implemented some or all of these 
recommendations, my experience is that they are not common practice. Yet over the past two decades, 
multiyear, multisite, multimillion dollar philanthropic initiatives have become increasingly common, 
and history reveals that the challenges many face are not unlike those encountered by CORAL. 
I hope this report is helpful in addressing an accompanying issue: How can a foundation best 
prepare to decide if major, midcourse change is necessary? None of my recommendations guarantees 
ultimate success; they are meant to increase the odds of success. None is meant to stifle the ambition, 
vision, and entrepreneurialism that are critical to mounting and carrying out major social initiatives; 
they are intended, instead, to channel and focus these intentions on genuine accomplishment. 
Gary Walker  
President Emeritus 
Public/Private Ventures
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At the midpoint of its CORAL initiative, The James Irvine Foundation gathered lessons about the 
pitfalls of planning and adjusting large-scale philanthropic programs — lessons it wishes to share 
with peer foundations and others who pursue ambitious social change objectives. Using the example 
of the CORAL initiative, this report describes the context and motivations behind the inception of 
major programming, pinpoints the grantmaker inclinations that help and hinder program design 
and implementation, and recommends strategies for overcoming the inherent challenges to honest 
midcourse assessments and improved program results. 
Key findings: the coraL initiative surfaced a set of inherent challenges that in turn Led to significant 
Lessons Learned with regard to the design, assessment, and correction of major philanthropic initiatives
 Inherent challenges
• Foundations are pressured to address 
critical social issues and take risks; change 
in an initiative may be perceived as a lack 
of willingness to maintain a commitment
• Ongoing program reviews merit lower 
priority than new grant work
• Major social initiatives address difficult-to- 
measure social issues
• Foundation staff primarily devoted to an 
initiative face conflicts of interest between 
personal promotion and surfacing needs for 
major change
• Grantees instinctively do not want major 
change in an initiative
• Grantee performance (or underperformance) 
has no relationship to the amount of assets 
a foundation has available to distribute
 Lessons learned
• Do not commit to a major initiative 
without a well-vetted theory of change, 
clear interim outc omes, and a field-tested 
information system that produces reliable 
outcome data
• Think critically about the facts on which 
the initiative is based
• Think equally critically about grantee and 
staff capacities and their alignment with 
initiative priorities
• Make external, midcourse review a 
planned event in large-scale initiatives
• Establish ongoing and structural internal 
oversight of initiative performance
• Be cautious about calls for more time, 
more resources, and more assistance
i n s i g h t  m i d c o u r s e  c o r r e c t i o n s
p a g e  0 6  |  t h e  j a m e s  i r v i n e  f o u n d a t i o n
 coraL initiative timeline
1996/1997
Board seeks to 
address lagging 
K-12 academic 
performance
1998
Pasadena test 
 site chosen
1999
Board approves 
CORAL; staff 
chooses four 
new sites
2001
CORAL is a full-
fledged initiative
2003
Evaluation reveals low ratings
Expanded research on after-
school programs undercuts 
some assumptions
Foundation leadership 
changes: Board, executive, 
and program
More than half of CORAL’s 
estimated budget is spent
midcourse assessment Launched
the communities organizing resources to advance Learning (coraL) initiative
The James Irvine Foundation launched the eight-year CORAL initiative in 1999 with the goal of 
helping to improve the academic achievement of children in the lowest-performing schools in five 
California cities: Pasadena, Long Beach, Fresno, San Jose, and Sacramento. CORAL is based on 
the premise that education is a community-wide responsibility, and not just the province of public 
schools, and therefore involves students, families, schools, and community-based organizations in 
high-quality out-of-school learning opportunities.  
As a result of the Foundation’s efforts, 37 program sites in these cities served approximately 5,000 
youth from low-income, low-performing schools. Most of the youth were of elementary-school age, 
primarily first- to fifth-graders, with a small proportion in middle-school grades. The Foundation 
provided implementation support in all of the cities, with the objective of funding the initiative for five 
to six years in each site. To date, the Foundation has committed $58 million to CORAL, making it 
the most significant and ambitious initiative undertaken by Irvine.
In January 2004, the Foundation selected Public/Private Ventures (P/PV) to serve as both the 
intermediary organization and evaluator to assist in leading the CORAL Initiative in its remaining 
years. An extensive review of the initiative revealed that, while all the CORAL sites shared the goal 
of improving the academic achievement of youths, programming in the early years of implementation 
varied greatly from city to city in its educational content. The educational content typically consisted 
of homework help and enrichment activities, offering youth opportunities to develop social skills, 
participate in sports, and explore expressive arts in a safe and supervised environment. In some 
cases, the enrichment activities had academic content specifically related to the school-day 
curriculum, but this aspect was not implemented consistently from city to city.
In 2006-2007, the final years of the initiative, P/PV staff is working closely with the lead 
organizations in the five CORAL cities. This work focuses on the quality and effectiveness of the 
sites’ after-school programming in order to enhance their capacity to improve student academic 
performance and ensure that lessons from the CORAL experience are documented and disseminated 
to the out-of-school field.
In June 1999, the Board of Directors of The James Irvine Foundation voted to undertake what 
ultimately would be the largest initiative in the Foundation’s history: an eight-year, $58 million effort 
to improve the educational performance of low-achieving students in California. The initiative, called 
Communities Organizing Resources to Advance Learning (CORAL), had two major goals:
•	 Plan	and	fund	after-school	programs	through	a	community	organizing	and	nonprofit	
collaboration process that would improve in-school performance of youth in five demonstration 
cities in California 
•	 Mobilize	a	shared	sense	of	responsibility	among	families,	schools,	and	communities	to	 
support and educate children in CORAL cities and beyond and to advocate for statewide 
education reforms
compelling need
The Foundation’s decision to undertake CORAL was the product of extensive Board-staff 
interaction over a two-year period. The impetus came in 1996–97 from several Board members 
who called attention to the critical nature of California’s lagging performance at the K-12 level and 
perceived a necessity for the Foundation to get involved. 
Almost two decades after the well-known Kerner 
Commission report, data on educational achievement indicated 
a lack of substantial or widespread progress in California. The 
number of non-English-speaking immigrant children entering 
California was rising. And the federal Department of Education had 
recently increased its investment in after-school programming from 
$50 million to $1 billion, creating an opportunity to influence the 
use of federal as well as state, local, and private dollars.
inquiry and debate
Due to restrictions of its trust concerning the support of public entities, the Foundation had 
little direct experience in K-12 public education. Still, inspired by the Board’s interest and motivated 
by the compelling need, the Foundation’s staff was determined to find some way to become involved 
in improving academic performance — particularly that of economically disadvantaged youth already 
behind in school. Senior staff envisioned a multi-site demonstration program where community 
organizations, families, and community leaders would work together to create an agenda of shared 
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 staff consulted with a number 
of educational leaders and 
academics who had experience 
with non-school, community 
organization-based educational 
pr ogramming.
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educational goals, advanced through after-school activities delivered via the coordinated efforts of local 
youth service providers.
By focusing on after-school programs, the Foundation would avoid a direct engagement with 
the complex world of public education, where it had limited experience given its trust restriction. By 
requiring a community organizing and collaboration process in each of five demonstration cities and 
providing support to youth-serving organizations, the Foundation would draw on its own relevant 
experience.
Early staff and Board discussions surfaced a dilemma: How could the effort make more 
than a marginal positive difference in the lives of students without directly engaging public school 
institutions? Several Board members wondered if funding 
advocacy directly might be the better course. It would ensure 
involvement with key issues, and would avoid the operational 
complexity of a multisite demonstration of locally coordinated 
after-school programming. Board members were also concerned 
about how to effectively transfer to other California cities the 
operational lessons from the demonstration sites.
Staff consulted with a number of educational leaders and 
academics who had experience with non-school, community 
organization-based educational programming. They arranged 
for several of these experts to share their knowledge at a 
Foundation Board retreat. After almost two years of discussions 
and planning, the Board formally approved proceeding  
with CORAL.
The factors that ultimately led to the Foundation’s decision included: 
•	 Both	Board	and	staff’s	desire	to	address	a	critical	social	issue,	in	this	case	lagging	 
student achievement
•	 Staff’s	follow-up	planning	work,	which	was	affirmed	by	outside	experts	and	resulted	in	building	
momentum and reinforcing internal enthusias m for undertaking the project
•	 Staff	assurance	that	the	aspect	of	the	project	where	the	Foundation	had	the	least 
experience — specifically, the content of after-school programming that would produce 
educational results — could be guided by solid evidence and the experience of others
•	 A	belief	that	the	initiative	was	structured	to	have	influence	beyond	the	demonstration	sites	
“ We need not demonstrate whether 
community-learning supports can 
improve academic performance 
since research and practice strongly 
support the efficacy of community 
education. rather, what needs 
demonstrating is whether we  
can do this at scale.” 
 Staff presentation as documented in 
minutes of June 1998 Board Meeting
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Early Implementation Experience
test site
CORAL planning papers recommended neither a competitive process to select the demonstration sites 
nor any local financial contribution to each site’s operation. The Foundation would fund the entire 
initiative, and it would handpick the localities involved.
The planners called for a test site — one city that would undertake CORAL and generate 
lessons useful to the decision to proceed with the larger initiative, applicable to the work of possible 
future sites, and informative to the work of the Foundation. Based on a set of criteria for site selection, 
Pasadena was chosen as this test site in late 1998. In Pasadena’s first year of work, the challenges of 
widespread community organizing, nonprofit collaboration, school involvement, and program creation 
emerged. Progress was slower than planned or hoped for. Getting key players in the community to 
meet, agree on an educational agenda, and establish roles for working together on an after-school 
program — all of these activities proved staff- and time-consuming.
Three challenges called into question the Foundation’s intention for an inclusive process. 
First, a former YMCA facility became available early in the planning stages, and the Foundation 
supported, both in principle and financially, the local lead agency’s desire 
to purchase the property. The deal was conducted quickly to secure the 
property, and other participants in the community planning process objected 
because they were not consulted and because the location of the property 
presented transportation challenges for students from poorer areas. Second, 
many of the participants were under the impression that funding decisions 
would derive from the community planning process and were unaware that the lead agency would 
be a re-granting authority for Foundation funds. Third, the community organizations involved in the 
planning process did not want to target specific age groups or “gateway” markers as the Foundation 
had planned. Foundation staff had identified a set of key developmental gateways, such as the ability 
to read at grade level by fourth grade, that have been linked with continued academic success and that 
might, therefore, serve as leverage points for programmatic intervention.
Internal memos documented these difficulties in Pasadena and reflected increasing staff concern 
about the challenges inherent to CORAL. Already very much engaged in and enthusiastic about the 
initiative, staff did not interpret these difficulties as reasons to slow down or reconsider the CORAL 
initiative, but rather as challenges that could be addressed by applying additional Foundation staff and 
technical assistance and by providing more planning time at future sites. 
 progress was slower than 
planned or hoped for.
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planning to move forward
At their inception, initiatives like CORAL are typically planned at foundation headquarters and 
endorsed by outside experts. Often, early operational experience is much rockier than anticipated, 
posing significant questions: What should be done? By whom? When?
In the case of CORAL, a national advisory group was being formed, composed mostly of 
the experts who had enthusiastically endorsed the effort’s community organizing and collaboration 
approach. But even if this group had been fully functioning, and even if it had expressed concern, 
it lacked formal oversight authority. 
The Foundation had recently hired a program director to direct and oversee its Children, Youth 
and Families program, of which CORAL was the major initiative. That director shared the perspective 
of Foundation staff involved in CORAL’s planning that Pasadena’s issues were a source of lessons, 
and recommended that the Board devote additional Foundation resources to technical assistance and 
proceed to select several new sites.
decision-making factors: the foundation recognized several potential challenges to proceeding with coraL, but 
compelling forces prevailed
 Compelling forces
• California’s lagging K-12 performance
• Achievement gap between general population and 
economically disadvantaged students
• Increasing federal investment in after-school programs
• Board and staff interest
• Affirmation and support of experts
• Community organizing expertise within the Foundation
 Causes for concern 
• Little prior Foundation experience in K-12 public education
• Ability to transfer lessons to other California cities in question
• Test site surfaces planning and alignment issues
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initiative Launch
Though meeting minutes reflect several Board members’ concerns about CORAL’s early “test 
experience,” staff enthusiasm and recommendations prevailed. Challenges emerged in areas where the 
Foundation had experience, and staff did not think them insoluble. More resources were dedicated; 
more staff members were hired; more consultants were brought on. Over the next 18 months, staff 
chose four new cities for extended pre-planning and organizing work. A research firm was selected 
and began to design a formal outcomes evaluation and a management information system to guide the 
evaluation and ongoing local management of CORAL.
By 2001, CORAL was a full-fledged major initiative of The James Irvine Foundation. Based on 
the early experiences in Pasadena and at the other selected sites, and on Foundation staff’s response to 
those experiences, CORAL evolved to provide technical consultants assisting each participant site with 
six major components:
•	 Community-wide	organizing	and	planning	based	on	
educational goals and issues
•	 Nonprofit	collaboration	in	the	design	and	implementation 
of an array of after-school programs managed by the 
lead agency
•	 Family	outreach	and	training	to	improve	parental	
involvement in individual youth and community education issues 
•	 A	summer	work/learning	institute	for	older	youth
•	 A	Web-based	communication	system	for	cross-site	and	Foundation-site	communication
•	 Evaluation	and	information	systems
Foundation staff told each of the five demonstration sites and their Foundation-selected lead 
agencies that, to meet their ambitious organizing, coordinating and programmatic goals, each would be 
granted $2 million a year, for six years. Four full-time Foundation staff members worked primarily on 
CORAL and its five demonstration cities, and 15 consultants were engaged to assist the cities in their 
organizing, coordinating, and programmatic efforts.
 challenges emerged in areas 
where the foundation had 
experience, and staff did not 
think them insoluble.
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Midpoint Assessment and Correction
forces of change
The Foundation’s intention was that, by 2003, CORAL’s five sites would be in full operation. 
Organizing and coordinating work had consumed much of this period’s time and resources, and the 
number of youth enrolled in a CORAL after-school program was much smaller than expected. It 
proved challenging to develop and implement a system to collect CORAL participant registration 
and attendance information. These challenges delayed analysis 
of the links between participation of youth and documented 
outcomes, hampering the ability of evaluators to produce timely 
data. In May 2003, the evaluation firm’s first major report to the 
Foundation gave, with a few exceptions, low ratings to the quality 
of programming in the five cities. Aside from “homework help,” the 
report indicated that none of the programming had a direct educational component, instead offering 
students opportunities to enjoy new, enriching activities through their participation in art, music and 
sports. The evaluators also reported that the involvement of public schools and the alignment of 
programming with classroom teaching were, at best, inconsistent.
Foundation staff and Board members were very concerned, not only because of the lagging 
performance of CORAL sites, but because a stock market decline had decreased Foundation assets 
by 20 percent. CORAL was the Foundation’s most expensive project. Its low performance made it an 
obvious target for spending cuts. 
In addition, the body of knowledge about after-school programming had increased during the 
1997–2003 period, undercutting some previous assumptions about the relationship between after-
school programming and educational performance. Three general themes emerged from the expanded 
research literature: 1) It is very difficult to change educational performance through after-school 
programming — some scholars said that, given the modest hours involved compared to in-school 
time, it is nearly impossible; 2) it is likely to be especially difficult to change educational performance 
without direct connections to the skills or knowledge tested by schools; and 3) those students with the 
poorest school performance and greatest need for help are likely to lack basic literacy skills, rendering 
approaches like homework help largely ineffective. 
These new themes emerged from a selection of rigorous studies and earlier scholarly 
work that had become more visible as the public sector’s interest and investment in after-school 
programming grew dramatically in the 1997–2003 period. The new themes cast serious doubt on 
previous assertions about the positive potential of after-school programming to improve in-school 
performance — assertions that had served as CORAL’s foundation. 
 new themes cast serious doubt 
on previous assertions that had 
served as coraL’s foundation. 
midcourse review and recommendation 
Public/Private Ventures (P/PV) won separate competitions to serve as the initiative’s 
intermediary manager and evaluator. P/PV’s first job was to carry out a midcourse assessment  
helping Foundation staff and Board determine if CORAL should be continued, and if so, what  
form it should take.
P/PV’s assessment, based on examination of all data and documents produced, and on the 
results of structured observations and interviews by P/PV staff teams at each of the five CORAL sites, 
echoed and expanded the quality concerns of the original evaluator. Based on enrollment numbers, 
the assessment calculated CORAL’s cost per youth to be well beyond the $1,000 to $2,000 range that 
public and private funders around the nation would typically provide for after-school programs.
Given the results of recent studies about the low potential of after-school programming 
for improving in-school performance, the assessment also found that, in most of the cities, direct 
educational content was minimal or absent. Where it did occur, it was likely to be homework help of 
little use to students lacking basic literacy skills. The problem was larger than weak implementation. 
Even if improved, it was highly unlikely to meet CORAL’s original goal of improving student 
performance without substantial change in the basic program design.
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Equally important, The James Irvine Foundation had new executive and program leadership 
and new Board members. Aware of this emerging knowledge and faced with reports indicating 
weakness in almost every aspect of CORAL’s operation, the Foundation’s new leaders decided that an 
external perspective was needed.
The Board agreed with the staff’s recommendation. More than half of CORAL’s ultimate 
$58 million cost had been spent, with little to show. The original concerns of some Board members 
surfaced more strongly, and new members were anxious to establish firm standards of accountability. 
precursors: challenges at many levels precipitated coraL’s midcourse review
 program
• Small student enrollment
• Limited direct educational 
content in programming
• Overall programming 
quality rated low
• Escalating program costs
 foundation
• New executive and 
program leadership
• Significant decline in assets
• Desire for standards and 
accountability
 environment
• Stock market decline
• New research undercut 
CORAL’s founding 
assumptions
& &
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P/PV’s major recommendation was to focus CORAL’s work on providing after-school 
programming that contained a structured literacy component to improve the basic reading and writing 
skills of third- and fourth-graders performing below grade level. P/PV would have to approve this new 
literacy component and also provide assistance in design, training, and assessing implementation. P/PV 
had substantial experience in designing and testing literacy models, and in after-school programming 
of this nature.
P/PV also recommended that the organizing, family outreach, summer institute, and 
communication technology components would have to be cut back substantially — not solely because 
of the Foundation’s funding reductions (from $2 million to $1.6 million per year, per CORAL site in 
2003; further reduced in 2004 to $1.2 million per year, per site) — but also because these components 
were distracting participating cities from their significant, critical goal: to implement an after-school 
program that had a reasonable chance of improving basic skills and school performance.
managing change
The recommendation signified, in many respects, a fresh start for the CORAL sites. They 
would no longer be funded to operate a summer institute for older youth. The emphasis on 
community organizing was greatly reduced. Requirements for a communication linkage among 
the sites and branding of the CORAL name were downscaled or abandoned. Instead, the sites 
were to focus on upgrading the quality of their enrichment 
programming, adding a high-quality literacy component, and 
reducing their cost per student. 
The Foundation’s new leaders supported these 
recommendations. Their own judgments were affirmed 
by this rigorous assessment of CORAL’s design and 
implementation. The recommendations afforded hope that 
CORAL’s original goal could be met without terminating 
the initiative and seriously undercutting the reputations and 
capacities of the lead organizations in the five cities — or 
destroying the hope for young people that the initiative had stimulated among many local institutions 
and leaders.
The Foundation’s Board also supported these recommendations, but asserted that it would 
not extend the initiative’s original projected length: six years for each city. These changes, and the 
evaluation of their outcomes, would take place within the approximately three years remaining  
in the initiative.
Participants at all five demonstration cities decided to remain involved, though they vocalized 
concerns about the changes. They had to adjust to working with an intermediary rather than directly 
 major mid-course recommendation: 
focus on after-school programming 
containing a structured literacy 
component to improve basic reading and 
writing skills of third- and fourth-graders 
performing below grade level.
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with the original Foundation staff, taking on new and unfamiliar literacy work, dismantling CORAL 
components they had focused on for several years — with further funding reductions if the changes 
did not go well. Not surprisingly, all of these adjustments were upsetting.
The Foundation had concluded that this major initiative needed a midcourse assessment by an 
independent agency. It had then made the difficult decision to keep the initiative alive, but to change 
it significantly. And, the Foundation had shifted the locus of responsibility for managing these changes 
from an internal staff team to an outside intermediary, with continued involvement by Irvine’s senior 
program staff in oversight, grantmaking decisions, reporting, and evaluation.
Two years later, the midcourse correction has 
been accomplished in four of the original five sites. 
Each city has a good to high-quality literacy component 
coupled with enrichment activities, such as art or 
sports. Each CORAL city provides a good model for 
integrating youth development and educational activities, 
and each has maintained its distinct identity.
These changes required extensive hands-on training and onsite observation and feedback. P/
PV literacy staff often spent weeks in individual cities working with local staff. The change process 
incorporated several written performance reviews each year, as well as annual reviews with each city 
at the Foundation’s offices. The “correction” work required approximately $500,000 of P/PV staff time 
each year — over $100,000 per city. Throughout, it was not always clear that change would take place 
with the level of quality desired by all parties.
awaiting results
CORAL’s final evaluation results are not yet in, so the initiative’s ultimate implications are 
unknown. Interim findings indicate a clear connection between a youth’s literacy progress and the 
quality of programming he or she receives, as assessed by a CORAL-wide instrument devised by 
P/PV. These findings also show that the youths furthest behind make the most significant literacy 
advances.
It is also accepted that, whatever the final results, they will be the product of a clear, well-
implemented idea. The CORAL initiative of today is expected to advance understanding of what 
educational gains can be accomplished by after-school programming, which groups of youth are 
likely to receive the greatest benefit from the programming, the relationship of results to varying 
levels of program quality, and the costs of these accomplishments, while also yielding a more 
concrete definition of “quality.”  It is anticipated that this knowledge will be useful to policymakers, 
administrators, and program operators. And through the capture and dissemination of this knowledge, 
the basic purpose of a multisite research demonstration will have been met. Whether CORAL will 
 all participants at the five demonstration 
sites decided to remain involved, though they 
vocalized concerns about the changes.
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provide a model for widespread replication or some fundamental principles for broader adaptation 
remains to be seen.
The second of CORAL’s two original goals — to build advocacy strength for educational  
issues — will not be accomplished, at least certainly not in the ambitious way originally envisioned. 
The CORAL cities have produced advocates, some of whom sit 
on committees devising the rules for California’s state funding 
of after-school programs under Proposition 49.* Others are 
members or leaders of advocacy groups for after-school 
programming. They advocate strongly for literacy programming 
as a critical component of any local or statewide after-school 
effort that aims to increase the educational performance of youth 
lacking basic skills. But they are individuals, and while they 
represent the lead agencies in the CORAL cities, they do not 
represent broad coalitions, as originally hoped. Nor do they, for the most part, focus on issues beyond 
the funding and operation of after-school programs. 
The question posed for this report was less about CORAL’s ultimate strengths and weaknesses 
than about the midcourse change itself. Did the experience reveal any lessons worthy 
of future action by The James Irvine Foundation or other foundations?
 Whether coraL will provide a 
model for widespread replication 
or some fundamental principles 
for broader adaptation remains 
to be seen.
*Proposition 49 is a ballot measure approved by California voters in 2002 to expand state support for after-school programs serving California’s 
elementary and middle school students, basing the state’s annual contribution on the status of California’s general fund.
evolving focus: a midcourse review led the foundation to revisit and narrow coraL’s priorities
1999
prioritY a
Plan and fund after-school programs through 
a community organizing and nonprofit 
collaboration process that would improve 
in-school performance of youth in five 
demonstration cities in California 
prioritY B
Mobilize a shared sense of responsibility 
among families, schools, and communities 
to support and educate children in CORAL 
cities and beyond, and to advocate for 
statewide education reforms
Today
singLe prioritY
Plan and fund after-school programs with a 
structured literacy component designed to 
improve the basic reading and writing skills 
of children performing below grade level  
secondarY prioritY
Produce lessons and outcomes that will 
inform the future role and funding of after-
school programs in improving academic 
outcomes of youth from a public policy and 
program perspective
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Lessons
Weighing risks
Multiyear, multisite, multimillion-dollar initiatives like CORAL are not unusual. In fact, they have 
become increasingly common in philanthropy over the past two decades. These initiatives, like 
CORAL, address difficult social issues. Each carries a considerable and unavoidable risk that its core 
ideas are not sufficient or well-crafted enough to produce positive outcomes. Successful mitigation of 
that risk is only assured when the final results are in.
Early implementation problems such as those experienced at the CORAL sites are not unusual 
in large-scale initiatives. No formula exists to resolve the hard questions: Should anything be done? 
By whom? When? Answers are particular to the initiative. It is tempting to assert that arriving at the 
answers is a simple matter of continuous staff diligence. When 
implementation issues arise, an organization’s best bet is to 
have enlisted enough capable, experienced staff, and to have 
incorporated a regular executive and Board review.
But the CORAL initiative had all of these elements: smart, 
capable staff, and regular executive and Board reviews. Yet at its 
midpoint — four years and over $30 million invested — it was 
experiencing serious implementation problems. The number of 
participants fell far short of agreed-upon goals. Cost per participant was more than double  
that which could be supported by public funding streams. The observed quality of programming  
was poor to moderate.  Programming aimed specifically at the initiative’s fundamental goal — 
increasing educational performance — was either weak or nonexistent. Further, recent studies cast 
serious doubt on the likelihood that CORAL’s approach, even if well implemented, would produce 
educational progress.
inherent challenges
Yet even with this seemingly clear-cut case of a major initiative in deep trouble, it took an 
unrelated set of external circumstances to force change. The problems outlined in this report happened 
to coincide with a decline in the Foundation’s assets due to the poor economic environment that all 
foundations faced from 2000 to 2003. During this time period, The James Irvine Foundation was 
also undergoing a change in executive and program leadership and the initiation of a Foundation-
wide strategic planning process. If it were not for these forces external to CORAL, organizational 
inertia might have prevailed. Why? To put it most directly, the forces, structure, and incentives of 
the philanthropic world are geared toward staying the course — or expanding the course. The call 
for more time, resources, and technical assistance is not an unusual large-foundation response to an 
initiative’s early or midcourse problems.
 early implementation problems such 
as those experienced at the coraL 
sites are not unusual in large-scale 
initiatives.
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Several inherent challenges work in combination against change:
Foundations are pressured to address critical social issues and take risks. But these very 
pressures also make it difficult to make major midcourse changes. No philanthropic official wants to 
be accused of walking away from a tough social issue or being unwilling to take big risks. The risk 
of failure is sometimes more palatable than the accusation that one has not tried hard enough. This 
position, in many cases, ultimately prevails over major midcourse change.
Ongoing program reviews merit lower priority than new grant work. For many large 
foundations, preparing for new grants is a board and staff priority. This is particularly the case at 
the Board level where, over time, trust is extended to staff working on prior grants, and time and 
attention are naturally focused on new grants and new areas of work.
Major social initiatives address difficult-to-measure social issues. The issues are complex and 
the metrics of success are challenging to create — and almost never have a bottom line as direct as a 
profit/loss statement. The pressure to act and to create major change rarely has a definitive or certain 
quality to it. It always includes more guesswork than anyone would prefer. 
Foundation staff primarily devoted to an initiative — as was the case with CORAL — face 
conflicts of interest between personal promotion and surfacing needs for major change. Staff members’ 
continued employment and opportunity for advancement are tied to the initiative’s longevity and 
perceived effectiveness. In addition, initiative-devoted staff 
members tend, over time, to sympathize and identify with 
their grantees. They believe, deeply and intently, in what 
they are doing. In short, staff’s incentives, sympathies, and 
beliefs work against an internally-generated call for major 
change. These are normal human responses, but they can 
affect judgment. And because the philanthropic world has 
a deep commitment to noble aspirations, it has greater 
difficulty than the commercial sector in discerning when a 
course change is needed as well as instituting the proper 
checkpoints along the way. Initiative-devoted staff members, when confronted with serious problems, 
are likely to do what Irvine’s CORAL staff did: plead for more resources, more time, and increased 
technical assistance for the grantees. Staff vigilance is not sufficient.
Grantees instinctively do not want major change in an initiative. For grantees, change means 
more work (most likely, as in this case, unfamiliar work) and perhaps less funding. It is not surprising 
that they are usually emotionally and practically committed to what they are accustomed to doing. 
Even if they acknowledge that things are not going well, they are likely to prescribe the same solution 
as foundation staff: more time, more resources, more assistance. Grantees’ resistance to change can 
place a formidable pressure on foundation leadership, especially when, as in CORAL, a broad array 
of local organizations and leaders has become involved and a considerable sum of money is at stake. 
Letters to a president, to board members, and even to the media, are not unusual. Philanthropic 
organizations have come to expect grantee praise as a side effect of having money to give.  
 major social initiatives address 
difficult-to-measure social issues.  
the issues are complex and the 
metrics of success are challenging  
to create — and almost never have  
a bottom line as direct as a profit/ 
loss statement.
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Also expected is criticism from organizations doing the “hard work on the ground.” This feedback is  
not taken lightly at the executive or Board level. It is always tempting to still this criticism by staying  
the course.
Grantee performance (or underperformance) has no relationship to the amount of assets 
a foundation has available to distribute. Unlike the business sector, poor performance poses no 
ultimate threat. The need for foundations to meet payout goals simply increases the force of the 
pressures outlined above. 
Lessons Learned
None of the inherent challenges described above is intended to question the commitment, 
competence, or sincerity of foundation or grantee personnel. Nor is it intended to imply that 
many, if not most, foundation officials are unaware of these challenges. This summary is an 
acknowledgement that the incentives and pressures inherent to 
philanthropic organizations make it less likely that a carefully 
considered midcourse assessment and change will occur simply 
because things aren’t going well. Awareness of these pressures and 
incentives is not enough. Large-scale initiatives like CORAL — 
because of the size of their investment and the possibility (in many 
cases, the objective) that their results will affect policy and funding 
decisions at other foundations and in the public sector — need 
special consideration in staffing, governance, and review processes. This is CORAL’s major lesson. 
Following are specific recommendations foundation leaders may consider in carrying out this lesson.
Lesson One: Do not commit to a major initiative without a well-vetted theory of change, 
clear interim outcomes, and a field-tested information system that produces reliable outcome data. 
Ambitious ideas to solve tough social problems are the lifeblood of most foundations. But ambitious 
idealism should not exclude sound strategies for implementation and reliable ways to track progress. 
These are its rudder. Often the tasks of developing a theory of change, interim outcomes, and an 
information system — if they are undertaken at all — are left to the evaluation portion of a major 
initiative. The predictable outcome of this timing is that the activities serve the evaluation, and the 
evaluation’s needs are not congruent with those of operators, managers, and overseers. Rather, these 
tasks help ensure that ambitious ideas are implemented effectively. When they are not accomplished, 
breakdowns are evident to all concerned. Ambitious visions and goals are the easiest aspect of 
philanthropy; accomplishment and implementation are the hard jobs. Evaluators can help in creating 
a theory of change, interim outcomes, and an information system, but their ultimate usefulness is the 
responsibility of initiative operators and foundation managers and overseers.
 Large-scale initiatives like 
coraL need special consideration 
in staffing, governance, and 
review processes.
Lesson Two: Think critically about the facts on which the initiative is based. Foundations 
should not be afraid to take risks or confront tough issues. And doing so necessarily means going 
beyond the bounds of what is known with any certainty. This recommendation is, therefore, not 
about playing it safe. It is about playing it smart: knowing the extent of the risk being taken and the 
number of boundaries to be breached. 
In the CORAL case, early planning and Board briefing materials assert that it was an 
established fact, without controversy, that after-school programs can improve school performance. 
This “fact” was the cornerstone on which the entire initiative was built. But the fact was not quite 
a fact. It was an assertion, backed by correlational evidence, strong advocacy, and many inspiring 
stories. The assertion was presented without a body of scientifically reliable evidence to back it up. 
Further, even less evidence indicated if any particular program content was necessary to achieve 
educational improvement. No one knew whether any after-school program would suffice or whether 
success required a particular content and dosage. A lack of evidence and particular content guidance 
may not merit curtailing an initiative. But they might, if more clearly acknowledged, have guided 
CORAL to gain more understanding of those unknowns. 
Without this acknowledgement, the CORAL initiative 
proceeded to focus on a host of other issues — community 
organizing, organizational collaboration, and advanced use 
of technology — without an equal focus on the offerings’ 
content and likelihood for producing educational gains. As one 
Trustee noted, some Board members were concerned about 
the repeated, unverified assurances of the general efficacy of 
after-school programming. But politeness prevailed — they did not pursue their concerns with the 
same doggedness they would have employed in a for-profit organization. This Trustee said that, in 
the future, it will be important to maintain politeness and civility, but to not let those virtues dampen 
tough-minded examination — the process of distinguishing fact from hope.
Lesson Three: Think equally critically about grantee and staff capacities and their alignment 
with initiative priorities. Two conditions important to carrying out large, ambitious initiatives are 
well known in the world of philanthropy: 1) nonprofit capacities are uneven, generally modest, and 
strongest in the content areas where organizations have experience; and 2) the means for increasing 
those capacities to carry out new and innovative initiatives have not been established with any 
consensus.
The CORAL initiative asked its grantees to undertake a number of tasks, many of which 
were not part of their skill sets or experience. Nor were many of those tasks part of The James 
Irvine Foundation staff’s experience or skill sets. In fact, the primary goal — increasing educational 
performance through after-school programming — was new to both Foundation staff and grantees. 
The tasks were amply funded, and the Foundation provided consultants in all the task areas. But so 
many new tasks simply overloaded grantees; they performed almost none of them well. And both staff 
and grantees had a natural response to such overload: 
i n s i g h t  m i d c o u r s e  c o r r e c t i o n s
p a g e  2 0  |  t h e  j a m e s  i r v i n e  f o u n d a t i o n
 in the future, it will be important to 
maintain politeness and civility, but to 
not let those virtues dampen tough-
minded examination — the process of 
distinguishing fact from hope.
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They focused their efforts on the tasks they had confidence and comfort in performing — or on those 
that presented the most obvious problem. The community organizing task met all of these criteria, 
robbing critical attention from the initiative’s crucial task of creating the program content most likely 
to produce educational impact.
Lesson Four: Make external, midcourse review a planned event in large-scale initiatives. 
Midcourse assessments by external parties should be a planned and expected component of major 
philanthropic initiatives. This would emphasize to foundation staff and grantees that the foundation’s 
commitment is to the ultimate social goal — not to staff and grantees, their enthusiasm, ideals, or 
camaraderie. The review would add a perspective — and perhaps 
even some useful ideas — unlimited by the focus and bonds that 
are forged in intense work on hard issues. It would acknowledge 
the uncertainty behind chosen metrics of measurement. Knowing 
such a review would take place would most likely also affect the 
pragmatism of early planning, the concreteness of goals set for 
the initiative, and the ongoing work of staff. In short, midcourse 
review as a planned element of an initiative offers benefits not only in program execution, but in the 
form of checks on natural forces from initiative outset.
Lesson Five: Establish ongoing and structural internal oversight of initiative performance. The 
James Irvine Foundation’s CORAL staff members were not only dedicated to the CORAL initiative; 
they also controlled all aspects of the initiative, including its evaluation. Foundation documents 
indicate that several key Foundation staff and several Board members had serious concerns about 
the CORAL initiative as it was being planned. But without any special, formal oversight structure in 
place, those concerns were not explored rigorously. Other staff went about their jobs; Board members 
went away until the next Board meeting. 
For some boards, the most prudent response would be to create a Board subcommittee. Some 
will object that this is too time-consuming for a foundation’s Board members, that it intrudes too 
much on management’s role, or that it assigns greater responsibility for one aspect of a foundation’s 
operations to a select group of Board members. But the size and potential impact of initiatives like 
CORAL would seem to diminish those objections from a “good governance” perspective. Dominant 
themes in the history of such initiatives over the past several decades —  modest results and weak 
implementation — underscore the prudence of such oversight. Another powerful reason is that 
forming a Board subcommittee would add strong, non-expert oversight from the beginning. The 
dominance of “experts” is a mixed blessing in initiatives where, in fact, little expertise exists, especially 
around practical issues involved in implementation.
Another option is to create a staff review team, with regular meetings and recorded minutes. 
While peers may fear retribution on their own initiatives, an executive committed to this option 
can make it a culture-shaping practice — a dose of tough professionalism in institutions where being 
 the coraL initiative asked its 
grantees to undertake a number of 
tasks, many of which were not part of 
their skill sets or experience.
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committed and trying hard too easily become substitutes for actual accomplishment. It can also temper 
staff identification with initiatives and grantees and increase their commitment to the foundation’s 
goals and improvement.
Experience indicates that the external advisory committee is the weakest response. Such 
committees rarely have or feel governance responsibility, and they meet too infrequently to make 
major change recommendations. CORAL’s national 
advisory committee met once or, at most, twice a year, 
and its discussions were based on specially planned and 
structured staff presentations and site visits. Conversations 
with several committee members during the midcourse 
assessment revealed little awareness of the extent or severity of CORAL’s implementation issues, its 
failure to meet agreed-upon goals, or its very high unit costs
Lesson Six: Be cautious about calls for more time, more resources, and more assistance. 
Sometimes, of course, “more” is the right response. But it is too easy to assume that because 
something is difficult to do, “more” is needed to get it done. This is especially true with regard to  
the coordination of local institutions and resources, and recovery from early implementation problems. 
The history of major initiatives offers little evidence that extended time and increased external 
resources produce better results in either of these areas.  
In fact, difficulties in these areas often signal weak 
capacity or deep divisive forces that time is as likely 
to prolong as to solve. Increased funds can muffle 
community discord temporarily, but that is poor 
preparation for sustainability after the initiative ends  
and the philanthropic partner exits. 
In CORAL’s case, early problems in the test site 
led Foundation staff to recommend adding time for community planning and coordination for that site 
— and for all future sites. Yet, the highest performing sites did not need extended time; performance 
was not empirically connected to increases in time and money. Given that the ultimate goal of a 
demonstration is to produce a model or lessons for policymakers and funders, at some point, the cost 
and time it takes to achieve success undercut the project’s usefulness and viability.
 Without any special, formal oversight 
structure, concerns were not explored 
rigorously.
 sometimes, of course, “more” is the right 
response. But it is too easy to assume 
that because something is difficult to do, 
“more” is needed to get it done.
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Conclusion
When foundations work at the largest scale on social change initiatives that channel millions of 
dollars and engage vast human resources across multiple communities, the risk of inefficiency and 
ineffectiveness may undermine the enormous potential for good. Operating at a large scale, therefore, 
requires a special level of strategic planning, careful oversight, and a system of checks 
and balances that mitigates the inertia described in this report. 
In the case of the CORAL initiative, a set of programmatic, organizational, and external 
conditions forced a midcourse assessment that revealed the need for dramatic change to achieve 
the initiative’s fundamental goal. The initiative was retooled and, as a result, those involved have 
renewed hope for its success. But the success of initiatives of CORAL’s magnitude should not rely on 
happenstance. Instead, candid assessment should be integral to initiative design, and the real possibility 
of a change in course should remain on the table throughout implementation.
Some of the recommendations noted in this report add cost and structure to already complex 
and costly initiatives, and thus are intuitively unappealing. They ring of bureaucracy. But in fact, 
the cost and structures of philanthropic governance and oversight have not always kept up over 
the past several decades with the magnitude and aspirations of the initiatives undertaken. Keeping 
administrative costs low and maintaining high spirits among entrepreneurial staff are worthy 
goals — but not at the expense of weak performance and the inability to overcome inertial forces.
Once a need for change is surfaced, accepting it and doing the right things to address it 
is a process likely to challenge programmatic precedence, organizational reputations, and individual 
passions. Honest criticism can be difficult to receive, and the resulting recommendations, difficult 
to follow. And, it is not easy to shift off of a path of multiyear investment partway through the 
journey. But when an effort, however large and complex, is not generating the benefits for which it 
was conceived, a change of course is the only conscionable action to take. If the adage that “anything 
worth doing is worth doing right” applies in any case, it certainly applies to endeavors that draw on 
the greatest financial and human resources and deal with the most serious of social needs.
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Demonstrates a relationship between key CORAL approaches 
and the academic progress of English learners. Makes the 
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boosting the achievement of  this growing student population.
Highlights fi ndings from independent research on CORAL. 
Informs those who seek to fund, design, implement and 
otherwise advance effective after-school programs.
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2008 Update: The Rest of the Story
In 2007, Public/Private Ventures completed its evaluation of the CORAL initiative. The James  
Irvine Foundation and P/PV are pleased to share CORAL findings and lessons learned in a series  
of publications released in early 2008. 
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